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Abstract. Recent studies have shown that Deep Leaning models are
susceptible to adversarial examples, which are data, in general images,
intentionally modified to fool a machine learning classifier. In this paper,
we present a multi-objective nested evolutionary algorithm to generate
universal unrestricted adversarial examples in a black-box scenario. The
unrestricted attacks are performed through the application of well-known
image filters that are available in several image processing libraries, mod-
ern cameras, and mobile applications. The multi-objective optimization
takes into account not only the attack success rate but also the detection
rate. Experimental results showed that this approach is able to create a
sequence of filters capable of generating very effective and undetectable
attacks.
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1 Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has witnessed a significant progress over the last decade and
it has been effectively applied to a variety of applications in different machine
learning domains achieving state-of-the-art performance. The great success of
DL models, both in academia and industry, made them object of attacks. Peo-
ple started investigating the vulnerability and security aspects of such models
since attacks pose significant risks and challenges for real-world security-sensitive
systems such as medical diagnosis, voice controllable systems, and autonomous
driving. Recent studies have shown that Deep Neural Networks, despite their su-
perior performance, are remarkably vulnerable to adversarial attacks, creating
severe security issues at the time of deployment of such systems.
The attacking techniques, at the highest level, are classified in per-instance
attacks and universal attacks. In the first class we can find all those systems
that generate a different perturbation for each image; in that case a separate
optimization process has to run for each image in order to find the corresponding
adversarial image [18,28,27,5,10,14,31]. On the other hand, in the second class
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when applied to ’any’ image, can fool the classification system; these systems
are called universal because they are essentially image-agnostic [17,11,19,26].
Moreover, the adversarial attacks follow the typical classification used in
security sectors that distinguish white-box attacks, i.e. attacks having access to
the target network model and underlying training policy, from black-box ones
in which the parameters and the underlying architecture are unknown to the
attacker.
If we consider the type of the applied perturbations, the attacks can be classi-
fied as restricted or unrestricted. In the restricted case, the modifications applied
to the original image are usually small and bounded by a Lp-norm distance mea-
sure, forcing the adversarial image x∗ to be as close as possible to the original
one. On the contrary, unrestricted attacks use large perturbations without Lp-
bounded constraints that manipulate the image in order to create photo-realistic
adversarial examples. In this case the objective is not to limit the modifications
on pixels but limit the human perception that a modification has been applied
[27].
From the point of view of the expected results, the attacks are further dis-
tinguished in untargeted, when the aim is to simply generate a misclassification,
and targeted, when the misclassification is driven towards a specified target class.
In this scenario, the robustness of DNN against adversarial examples has
gained significant attention in the last few years, and several approaches and
systems able to detect adversarial attacks have been proposed and developed.
Some of them follow the adversarial training approach increasing the network
robustness by means of adversarial examples in the training process [31,18,15,33],
while others propose ad-hoc trainable techniques like distillation [24], perturba-
tion rectifying [1], feature squeezing [35] input reconstructions [25], input trans-
formation [9], input denoising [16], and many more. Although these defense
mechanisms were inspired by different perspectives, they are mostly limited to
safeguard against norm-bounded attacks.
In a black-box scenario, traditional approaches rely on gradient estimation
or on training a substitute network and transfer the generated examples to
the targeted model [6,22,21], but alternative, gradient-free optimization tech-
niques, mostly based on evolutionary algorithms, have been recently introduced
[2,20,34,29]. Among this group, techniques using Multi-Objective optimization
recently reached interesting results and are quickly emerging [30,8].
The majority of the proposed attacks are performed and optimized to add
small random perturbations to the pixel values. However, these artificial modifi-
cations are often not semantically meaningful and can create unnatural-looking
images that are easily detectable. For this reason, researchers start exploring new
types of threats models that can significantly change an input while maintaining
the semantics.
Such methods require either access to the targeted network architecture [38]
or additional resources like pretrained networks to perform image segmentation
[27], colorization and style transfer [4]. In some cases, it is necessary to train
neural networks from scratch in order to find the adversarial perturbations [28].
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In our work, we decided to focus on generating non-targeted unrestricted
universal adversarial attacks in a black-box scenario, since the limited knowledge
and ability of the attacker is more similar to a real-world scenario, making the
attack itself more challenging but its applicability more practical.
We propose a gradient-free method based on nested evolutionary algorithms
and multi-objective optimization that, given a set of commonly-used image fil-
ters, finds an optimal image-agnostic sequence of them that, when applied to
an image is hardly detectable and causes the classifier to misclassify the image.
The standard universal Lp-bounded attacks are transformed into universal un-
restricted attacks and a multi-objective evolutionary approach is used to build
a process able to optimize, at the same time, the attack success rates and the
attack detection rate.
By using well-known filters already available in several image processing li-
braries and in modern cameras and widely used in social media (e.g. Instagram),
we aim to reduce the awareness towards the applied modification.
The method provides two optimization stages. The first stage utilizes a ge-
netic algorithm in order to identify the optimal sequence of filters, whereas the
second one optimizes the parameters of each selected filter. For this stage we in-
vestigated three optimization strategies: genetic algorithm, evolutionary strategy
and a random approach with tournament.
To find a successful adversarial filter configuration, a population of candidate
solutions is evolved and the solution quality is assessed by means of a fitness
value. Our goal is to select filter sequences that will not alter the shape and
semantics of images while maximizing the attack success rate on the target
model. Moreover, since many deployed deep learning models are protected by
defense methods, we want to find an attack able to bypass such mechanisms.
Thus, we choose to incorporate the feedback given by the defenses methods
directly into the fitness function used for the filters optimization.
Given the conflicting nature of the above-mentioned objectives and motivated
by the success of multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEA) in other appli-
cations [39,3], we propose to model our method as a multi-objective optimization
problem. We employ the non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II (NSGA-II)
for the selection process.
The experimental results demonstrates the effectiveness of our method when
tested against one of the most highly rated detection frameworks, namely Feature
Squeezing [35]. Our algorithm is able to bypass such defense in most of the cases,
having a detection rate smaller than 5% on the testing set while achieving good
results in term of attack sucess rate.
2 Related works
Over the years, many methodologies have been proposed for generating adver-
sarial examples in both white-box and black-box settings.
Szegedy et al. [31] were the first to introduce the concept of adversarial
examples by analyzing the properties of neural networks that make these models
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susceptible to adversarial attacks. The authors used box-constrained L-BFGS
to calculate the perturbation needed to get the image misclassified. Based on
this work, Goodfellow et at. [10] explained that the linear part of the high-
dimensional model is to blame for their sensitivity to small changes in the input.
They also introduced a fast method for generating adversarial examples (FGSM).
In the following years, a variety of other attack algorithms have been proposed,
both in the white-box [5,23,18] and black-box scenario [22,6,17].
Most of the proposed works on adversarial examples have been focusing on
finding small perturbations that can change the predictions of a classifier: in
some cases it is sufficient to change just one pixel [29] or inject a random quasi-
imperceptible-perturbation [17]. Due to the urgency of taking counter-measures,
several detection and defense methods have been introduced to overcome such
vulnerabilities. Therefore, nowadays, these types of adversarial images are eas-
ily detectable by applying denoising filters or by adversarial training [36]. For
this reason, many researchers have been shifting their attention to unrestricted
adversarial attacks that employ large and visible perturbations but have the ad-
vantage that the resulting images are still looking natural and non-suspicious to
the human eye.
Hosseini et al. [13] were one of the first to analyze the effectiveness of unre-
stricted adversarial examples on deep learning models. They proposed to ran-
domly change the hue and saturation values of an image while maintaining the
shape of the objects. The authors in [27] address the limitations of [13] which
was found to produce unnatural colors by employing priors on color perception.
Other works propose to craft malicious inputs by applying image-enhancement
filters obtained by means of neural networks [28] or via gradient descent opti-
mization [38]. Pretrained colorization models and texture style transfer methods
have also been successfully utilized without norm constraints on the perturba-
tions [4].
Our idea is to use well known filters that are available in several libraries and
mobile applications used extensively every day to enhance photos and images.
The power of this application relies on the natural presence of these filters in
almost all the images we can find everywhere and this essentially makes them
transparent to the human perception. Clearly, the filters have to be “gently”
applied otherwise the resulting image could become unrealistic, for example with
supersaturated colors, but in general they cannot alter the image semantic.
In the world of adversarial attacks, recent studies have proposed the use of
evolutionary algorithms to overcome the limitations imposed by the methods re-
lying on gradient computation/estimation as well as the long training time neces-
sary in the generative approaches. The main benefit is that a population-based
optimization algorithm does not require gradient computation nor a differen-
tiable objective function. Furthermore, the gradient-free nature of such methods
makes the attacks more robust to gradient masking and obfuscation defenses.
Several works which employ a variety of evolutionary algorithms such as Dif-
ferential Evolution, Genetic Algorithm, and Particle Swarm Optimization have
been presented. All of them evolve a population of feasible solutions, according
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to a fitness function. They make use of similar strategies: the new candidate
solutions are obtained by applying small random perturbations to the initial
population and the fitness of each population individual is evaluated to find a
successful example [29,2,34,20]. Moreover, two very recent papers introduced the
idea to use multi-objective evolutionary algorithm to produce image perturba-
tions trying, at the same time, to maximize the attack success rate and minimize
the perturbation size [8,30]. Differently from them, we propose to include in the
optimization process, alongside the maximization of the attack rate, the mini-
mization of the detection rate of defence methods in order to produce attacks
that will be intrinsically successful. To the best of our knowledge there are no
other works that take into consideration the detection rate while crafting the
attack.
3 Detection method: Feature Squeezing
Ever since the adversarial attacks were fist introduced, there has been a continu-
ous battle between attacks and defenses. Numerous countermeasures have been
proposed to mitigate the threat of adversarial attacks. These include adversarial
training [10] , defensive distillation [24], detection methods based on requantiza-
tion and median filtering [35], input reconstructions [25], input transformation
[9], input denoising [16], and many more.
We choose Feature Squeezing [35] as a detection strategy since is one of the
most popular techniques that achieves high detection rates against state-of-the-
art attacks.
This method is based on the observation that often the space of feature
vectors of images is unnecessarily large which gives plenty of manipulation pos-
sibilities for generating adversarial examples. The authors proposed to squeeze
out unnecessary input features in order to reduce the search space accessible
to an adversary by means of two feature squeezing methods: color bit depth
reduction of each pixel and spatial smoothing (local and non-local smoothing).
Therefore, it is possible to tag an image as legitimate or as adversarial by com-
paring the model’s prediction on the original image with its prediction on the
squeezed image. If the difference between the prediction vectors of the original
sample and the squeezed sample exceeds a certain threshold than the input is
identified to be adversarial. Given that the selection of an optimal threshold
value in not a trivial task and requires a training phase, for the experiments in
this work we refer to the thresholds reported by the authors in [35].
The authors also show that adversarial examples from eleven state-of-the-art
attacks can be successfully detected by combining multiple squeezing defenses
into a joint detection framework.
4 Image Filters
We employed Instagram inspired image filters to perform the attacks. The filters
were implemented using Python3 and the Pillow, OpenCV and Numpy libraries.
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We chose five of the most popular Instagram filters, specifically Clarendon, Juno,
Reyes, Gingham and Lark. Each filter has distinct characteristics and effects
given by different level of contrast, saturation, brightness, shadows, etc.:
– Clarendon adds light to bright areas darkness to dark areas, slightly increas-
ing saturation and contrast while keeping the mid-tones rather warm and
cooling down shadows and highlights.
– Juno only manipulates the contrast and the vividness of an image by in-
tensifying the yellows and reds making these colors pop out more than the
blues.
– Reyes adds a subtle old-time look by reducing the saturation and by bright-
ening up the photos.
– Gingham also gives a dusty-vintage feel to the image. It significantly lowers
the highlights and the saturation. To complete the look it applies a white
soft lens effect which draws the attention to the center of the images and
creates an elegant and dreamy atmosphere.
– Lark increases the exposure making the photo brighter and reduces the vi-
brance. Moreover, it also accentuates blues and greens while desaturating
the reds.
For each filter there are two parameters that the evolutionary algorithm has to
tune: intensity α and strength s.
The α manipulates the intensity of the filter, i.e. for Clarendon α determines
how much the dark areas are light, while for Juno the quantity of yellows and
reds that has to be applied, whereas for Gingham that parameter indicates the
intensity of the vintage effect. Following the same logic, for Lark α controls the
increment and decrement of the photo exposure. For the sake of clarity, in Table
1 the effects of the α parameter for each filter is reported.
Regarding the strength, it is the parameter of the convex interpolation among
the original image x and the manipulated image x∗, which is calculated as follows:
strength(x, x∗, s) = (1.0− s) · x+ s · x∗ (1)
thus, if s = 0 the output image of the filter is the original image, while with
s = 1 the filter returns the manipulated image x∗.
5 Problem Formulation and Backgrounds
Given an input image x ∈ X ⊂ Rd and its corresponding label y, let F be a
neural network classifier that (correctly) predicts the class label for the input
image x : F (x) = y. An adversarial attacks attempts to modify the input image
x adding a perturbation δ into an adversarial image x∗ = x + δ such that the
classifier was mislead into making a wrong prediction, i.e. F (x∗) 6= F (x). In
general the objective is to find the smallest perturbation δ ∈ Rd able to cause
the misclassification and this is obtained limiting the perturbation size, ||δ||p ≤ ε,
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Table 1. Effects of filters with different α values












xpi , x = (x1, ..., xn) (2)
In case of per-image approaches, a different δ is found for each image and it
is necessary to run the training process for each attack. On the other hand, in
case of universal approaches the objective is to find only one such δ able to fool
F for almost all the data points available in X, that is
F (x+ δ) 6= F (x), for almost all x ∈ X (3)
5.1 Multi-Objective Problem
In multiobjective optimization, the aim is to solve problems of the type1:
minimize f(x) := [f1(x), f2(x), . . . , fk(x)] (4)
subject to:
gi(x) ≤ 0 i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (5)
1 Without loss of generality, we will assume only minimization problems.
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hi(x) = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , p (6)
where x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn]
T
is the vector of decision variables, fi : IR
n → IR,
i = 1, . . . , k are the objective functions and gi, hj : IR
n → IR, i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . , p are the constraint functions of the problem.
Definition 1. Given two vectors x,y ∈ IRk, we say that x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for
i = 1, ..., k, and that x dominates y (denoted by x ≺ y) if x ≤ y and x 6= y.
Definition 2. We say that a vector of decision variables x ∈ X ⊂ IRn is non-
dominated with respect to X , if there does not exist another x′ ∈ X such that
f(x′) ≺ f(x).
Definition 3. We say that a vector of decision variables x∗ ∈ F ⊂ IRn (F is
the feasible region) is Pareto-optimal if it is nondominated with respect to F .
Definition 4. The Pareto Optimal Set P∗ is defined by:
P∗ = {x ∈ F|x is Pareto-optimal}
Definition 5. The Pareto Front PF∗ is defined by:
PF∗ = {f(x) ∈ IRk|x ∈ P∗}
When solving multi-objective optimization problems (MOPs), the aim is to ob-
tain the Pareto optimal set from the set F . Thus, given a MOP, the goal of
a Multi-Objective Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA) is to produce a good ap-
proximation of its Pareto front. One of the most widely used MOEAs for prob-
lems having only two or three objectives is the Nondominated Sorting Genetic
Algorithm-II (NSGA-II) [7]. This MOEA solves a MOP using nondominated
sorting and a crowding-comparison operator that acts as its density estimator.
6 Approach and Algorithm
We propose a nested-evolutionary algorithm for generating universal unrestricted
adversarial examples in a black-box scenario. Given a sequence of image filters as
input, the algorithm returns the best image-agnostic filter configuration which,
applied to the images from the dataset, greatly increases the classification error
of the target model.
The method consists of two evolutionary nested algorithms: the outer al-
gorithm is in charge of finding the sequence of filters to use, while the inner
algorithm has to choose the parameter values.
The population is composed by sequences of parameterized filters that are
applicable to images and transform them in possibly malign images.
Given a set S = {f1, f2, · · · fm} of m image filters, the outer algorithm geno-
type (with length l) is encoded as a list of integers representing the corresponding
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filters in S. Similarly, the inner algorithm genotype is represented by a list con-
taining the parameters used for each selected filter.
The associated phenotype, applied to a set of images, generates the adversar-
ial examples by applying the selected sequence of filters, with their corresponding
optimized parameters, to legitimate images.
6.1 Outer Algorithm
For the outer optimization step we employ a genetic algorithm: a population of
N candidate solutions is iteratively evolved towards better solutions. In order
to breed a new generation, population members are randomly selected and the
crossover and mutation operations are performed. The quality of the candidates
is evaluated based on their fitness values.
Initial population: it is generated by randomly selecting l filters from the set
S of available filters and their parameters are initialized with default values
equal to 1.
Crossover: a standard one-point crossover is used to generate new off-springs
from randomly selected members. Each child is guaranteed to inherit some
genetic information from both parents, including the optimized parameters.
Mutation: it is applied by substituting a filter with another one based on a mu-
tation probability. The substituent filter is initialized with random parameter
values. This way we also ensure a complete mutation of the parameters.
Selection: at the end of each iteration, we choose the N best individuals from
the set of 2N candidates (parents and offsprings) according to their fitness
values. This process is repeated until the algorithm exhausts the allowed
number of epochs.
6.2 Inner Algorithm
For the inner algorithm we propose and evaluate three different optimization
strategies: a genetic algorithm (GA), a (1, λ) evolutionary strategy (ES) and a
random-based approach with tournament (in Algorithm 1, defined as follows:
optimizerO , where O ∈ { ’GA’, ’ES’, ’Tournament’ }).
The genetic algorithm of the inner optimization has the same structure and
operators as the outer GA, except that its task is to evolve a population of lists
of parameters for every individual from the outer algorithm.
Alternatively to GA, we propose to optimize the parameters by using (1, λ)
evolution strategy with λ = 5. ES iteratively updates a search distribution by
following the natural gradient towards higher expected fitness. In our case, for
each list of parameters we compute a batch of N samples by perturbing the
original individual. A gradient towards a better solution is estimated using the
fitness values of the N samples. This gradient is then used to update the original
individual. The entire process is repeated until a stopping criterion is met.
Finally, the random-based method is implemented as a 2-way competition.
Given a solution inherited from the outer algorithm, a new individual is gener-
ated by randomly changing the parameters values of the original solution. The
10 A.E. Baia et al.
two candidates compete against each other in a tournament and the winner is
passed on to the next generation.
6.3 Evaluation
The last part of our algorithm is about how the evaluation is performed. A
candidate sequence of filters ȳ, and its own optimized parameters n̄, is decoded
as the phenotype b which is evaluated by querying the target neural network.
We modeled the fitness function as a multi-objective problem which accounts
for both the attack success rate as well as the detection mechanism bypassing
rate. The goal is to give the attacker the ability to bypass detection mechanisms.
We believe this to be a powerful feature of our method given that the field of
adversarial machine learning lacks such approaches.
Let F the target neural network, xi the i-th image of the original dataset
X and X* the set of perturbed images x∗i obtained by applying the sequence of
filters we want to evaluate to all the images in X, we define






F (xi) 6= F (x∗i ) (7)
where n is the size of the dataset X and X∗







where D is the chosen detector (e.g. feature squeezing), which returns 1 if
the image is detected as an attack, 0 otherwise.
Accordingly, we can define multi-objective problem of our interest as
minimize F(X,X∗) = {1.0−ASR(X,X∗), DR(X,X∗)} (9)
which is managed by means of the non dominated sorting and crowding distance
procedures of the NSGA-II technique [7]. The general structure of the proposed
algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
7 Experiments and Discussion
7.1 Experimental setup
We evaluate the proposed method by attacking the convolutional neural network
proposed by Papernot at al. in [24] and used also in [5] to prove the effectiveness
of their attack. The model is composed of a series of 2 convolutional layers having
64 3x3 filters paired with ReLU activation function and a max-pooling layer, 2
Effective Universal Unrestricted Attacks 11
Algorithm 1: General structure of the nested evolutionary algorithm
for generating adversarial examples
Input: Dataset D, population size N , epochs E
Extract the K batches B1, . . . , BK from D ;
Initialize population P of N individuals;
Evaluate each individual of P by the two fitness ASR and DR;
for e = 0 to E do
for i = 1 to K do
Offsprings = {∅} ;
for i = 1 to N do
Select randomly parent1,parent2 from P ;
p1 ← encode1(parent1) ;
p2 ← encode1(parent2) ;
yi = crossover(p1,p2);
yi = mutation(yi) ;
ni ← encode2(yi) ;
ni = optimizerO(ni) ;
Offsprings ← (yi, ni) ;
end
foreach (yi, ni) ∈ Offsprings do
b← decode (yi, ni) ;
Evaluate the fitness ASR and DR on batch Bi ;
end
P = selection(P , Offsprings) ;
end
end
return: best image-agnostic filter configuration;
convolutional layers with 128 3x3 filters with ReLU followed by a another max-
pooling layer, 2 fully connected layers with ReLU and a softmax layer used for the
final classification. This network was trained using the CIFAR-10 dataset which
is a very popular benchmark image dataset consisting in 50000 training and
10000 testing colour images with a resolution of 32x32, belonging to 10 different
classes. Dropout was used in order to prevent overfitting, and momentum and
parameter decay were employed to guarantee model convergence.
For these preliminary experiments, we choose to adopt the Feature Squeezing
detection method [35] as detection method in the fitness function used during the
optimization process since it is one of the most popular and low-cost techniques
that has been proven to achieve high detection rates (over 85% for CIFAR-10
and Imagenet dataset) against different famous state-of-the-art attacks.
The hyperparameters default values used to conduct the experiments were
fixed as follows, where not differently specified: number of filters = 5, mutation
probability = 0.5, batch size = 100, population size = 10 for the outer algorithm,
epochs = 3. For the inner algorithms we set the population size equal to 5 and
the number of generations was fixed to 3. To perform the detection we used the
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combination of features squeezers reported in [35] to work best for CIFAR-10
images: reduction to 5-bit depth, a local median smoothing and a non-local mean
smoothing, and threshold to find the illegitimate images set to 1.7547 2.
Dataset
We used the CIFAR-10 testing set for training our algorithm and evaluating
its effectiveness. The set was divided in two subsets: the first 200 images were
used for the filter configuration optimization process and the remaining 9800
images were used for testing the adversarial attack. The optimization subset of
images was chosen relatively small in order to measure the power of the universal
attack.
Selection of the training epochs, number of filters and parameters
range
Several experiments were carried out in order to estimate the best trade-off
between the performance of the proposed method and computation time. We
tested all three inner optimization algorithms (GA, ES and Tournament) with
the default parameters configuration except for the number of epochs which was
set to 10. We analyzed their attack success rate (ASR), feature squeezing de-
tection rate (DR) and computation time. We observed that they all had similar
performance-time behaviour. We decided to stick to 3 epochs since it was pro-
ducing good results while keeping the computational time fairly low. Figure 1
illustrates the attack and detection rate curve with respect to the number of
epochs with ES inner optimizer.
Fig. 1. Attack rate and FSDR wrt Epochs with ES optimizer.
2 https://github.com/mzweilin/EvadeML-Zoo/blob/master/Reproduce_
FeatureSqueezing.md
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Moreover, we also wanted to investigate the importance of choosing different
numbers of filters for creating the adversarial configuration. The minimum filters
selection was set to 3 while the maximum is the cardinality of set S of available
filters. We adopted the policy of no-repeating filters, meaning that a filter can
be picked only once inside a certain configuration. We calculated the attack rate
of our algorithm by using all three inner optimization methods. Table 2 shows
that using 5 filters has the best outcome in terms of attack success rate.
Table 2. Evaluation of attack success rate(ASR) with respect to the number of filters.










In our implementation filters can be applied using different features param-
eters similar to how Instagram allows users to control the effect of filters by
manually adjusting their intensities within a certain range. The parameters of
each filter can vary between a fixed range of values. The minimum and maxi-
mum values of each interval were found by performing a quality analysis on the
modified images with the above mentioned filters and diverse parameters values.
This analysis allowed to restrict the search space in order to further reduce the
training time. In order to evaluate the universality of our attack we applied the
optimized filter configuration to each image in the testing set and computed the






, x̂ ∈ X̂ (10)
where D corresponds to the features squeezing detector which returns 1 if the
image is identified as illegitimate and 0 otherwise, X̂ represents the set of suc-
cessful adversarial examples, and m = |X̂| is the cardinality of X̂.
In Table 3 we report the attack success rate and the detection rate for both
training and testing subsets with the default hyperparameters values, which were
found to work best.
First of all, from these results, we can note that, even if the attack success rate
is lower than the ones obtained by other methods in literature (also greater than
90% in some cases), these values should be fairly compared to the ones obtained
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Table 3. Attack success rate (ASR) and Feature Squeezing Detection Rate (FSDR)
with different optimizers on Carlini CNN and CIFAR-10 training and testing subsets,
epochs = 3, number of filters = 5.
Optimizer ASR % train set FSDR % train set ASR % test set FSDR % test set
ES 70 2.1 63.7 3.5
GA 68.5 2.9 63.8 3.4
Tournament 61 5.7 56.3 4.5
by the other methods excluding the attacks that would be blocked by a defense
mechanism. Considering that Xu et al. evaluated Feature Squeezing method
with respect to 11 different attacks on three different datasets and reported for
CIFAR-10 an overall detection rate of 84.5% [35], our attack is very effective
because among the successful adversarial images just very few attempts will
be blocked by the defense mechanism. Moreover, we can observe a very good
generalization ability of the model: when the attack model generated by our
method is applied to the test set, we lose less than 10% for ASR maintaining a
very low detection rate when a defense mechanism based on Feature Squeezing
method is applied.
7.2 Generated Images
Table 4 shows some successful adversarial examples generated by applying the
filter configurations with their respective optimized parameters found by the
proposed algorithm on the unseen images from the testing subset.
For each adversarial example we attached the original image and we also
indicate the classification labels before and after the modification. It is very
interesting to note that the solutions found by our method, i.e. the applied
perturbations, are very uniform across the image and no unnatural patterns or
high-frequency areas can be noticed.
8 Conclusions and Future Works
The experimental results show that the multi-objective method with detection
feedback is able to produce successful adversarial examples while keeping the
detection rate low. Even though the attack success rate is lower with respect to
other state-of-the-art methods (restricted & unrestricted) we have the advantage
of not being caught by detection methods. This indicates the potential of the
proposed attack whose goal is not only to force the classifier to mispredict but
also to evade possible defenses.
Nonetheless, there is a wide room for improvement. We intend to continue
this study since the topic of multi-objective evolutionary attacks opens up an
interesting research direction. We also plan to run more experiments on more
complex models and to test the universality of our attacks across multiple neural
networks architectures. Moreover, considering the availability of multi-objective
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Table 4. Successful adversarial attacks on CIFAR-10 testing subset. On the left: orig-
inal image; On the right: successful adversarial example.




Label names airplane : 0, automobile : 1, bird : 2, cat : 3, deer : 4,
dog : 5, frog : 6, horse : 7, ship : 8, truck : 9
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evolutionary methods like MOEA/D [37] able to take into account more than
two objective functions, we want to further improve our algorithm in order to
include in the fitness function the three components: attack success rate, de-
tection rate and image control. Differently from all the other approaches, our
idea is to manage the image perturbations and control it by using no-reference
image quality assessment like NIMA [32] or Frechet Inception Distance (FID)
[12] instead of the Lp-norms.
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